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Introduction
Domestic violence or intimate partner violence is a pervasive global phenomenon that 
can take the form of assault, aggravated assault, battery, forcible intercourse, beating, 
strangulation, coercion, emotionally abusive acts, stalking, harassment and controlling behaviors 
(Truman & Morgan, 2014). It may also include physical, sexual, psychological, economic, or 
emotional attacks against a domestic partner as an “attempt to exert control over the abused 
party” (Domestic Violence: Background, n.d., para. 1). The National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey found that 1 in 5 women (18.3% of U.S. Population) and 1 in 71 men (1.4% of 
the U.S. population) in the United States have been raped in their lifetime (Black, M.C., Basile, 
K.C., Breiding, M.J., et al., 2011, p.1). The report looked, date from 2010, the first year if data 
collection and reported that 51.1% of all female victims of rape were raped by intimate 
partners(Black, et. al, 2011, p.1). The population percentage jumps up to 33.5% of women in 
India who suffered some sort of domestic violence since the age of 15 in a 2007 survey of a 
population of 83,703 (Mari Bhat, et al., 2007, p. 498). Women from thirst to thirty-nine years of 
constituted the highest percentage of victims, 39.9% (Mari Bhat, et al., 2007, p. 498). One in two 
women (44.6%) in the United States and one in five men (22.2%) have been a victim of intimate 
partner violence other than rape in their lifetime (Black, et. al., 2011, p.19). 
The law provides certain protections like protection orders and divorce for victims of 
intimate partner violence. There are also several legal remedies available to victims. Domestic 
violence was treated as a violent crime under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Since 
domestic violence is a criminal matter the individual states of the United States have jurisdiction 
to legislate, prosecute, and imprison domestic violence offenders because of federalism.
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Unlike the legal system in the United States, the seventh schedule of the Constitution of 
India, enumerates the separation of powers between the central and state governments in three 
lists, the union list, the state list and the concurrent list (Constitution of India, Schedule 7). The 
states have jurisdiction, independent of the central government on items in the “state list”, items 
in the “union list” fall solely under the jurisdiction of the central government and both states and 
the central government can legislate on items in the “concurrent list”.
Criminal law and criminal procedure are on the concurrent list. The central and state 
governments have jurisdiction to legislate on items in the concurrent list. However many states 
including the state of Maharashtra follow one unified criminal law code and criminal procedure 
code. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) is the main source of criminal law in India and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is the main source of substantive administrative 
procedure on criminal law. Maharashtra does not have separate criminal laws or criminal 
procedure codes. The IPC criminalizes cruelty towards wives and women specifically under § 
498A, it also creates a distinct class of domestic violence homicide victims under § 304 B. This 
research deems to examine the differences in language used across the legislative landscape of 
domestic violence in the United States and India by conducting a content analysis study. It will 
examine laws that allow for domestic violence prosecutions and distinguish them from laws on 
the books. It will look at punishments for offenders and legal remedies available to victims.
Divorce is arguably an effective legal remedy which allows victims of domestic violence 
to remove themselves from dangerous living conditions. In New York State, under Domestic 
Relation Law, § 170 (1) a husband or wife may “procure a judgment divorcing the parties and 
dissolving the marriage” if the Plaintiff (husband or wife) suffers cruel or inhuman treatment at 
the hands of the Defendant that endangers the physical or mental wellbeing of the Plaintiff, 
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making it unsafe to live with the Defendant. (DRL § 170(1)).  Domestic Violence would qualify 
as cruel and inhuman treatment in New York. Since Indian Independence in 1947, the 
government has been unwilling and unable to institute a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). Therefore, 
divorce law is primarily governed by codified versions of religious dogma. Acts such as “The 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955”, “The Indian Divorce Act, 1989”, and “Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act, 1939” are some of the codified statutes that govern people of Hindu, Catholic, 
and Muslim religions respectively. 
Protection orders are another form of protection. In New York, anyone can file a family 
offense petition for a temporary order of protection, bring it to a court clerk, and the judge will 
grant  a summons for the abuser to appear on a specified date or a warrant for his or her arrest 
after review, and a temporary order of protection, typically until the date on the summons (Steps 
for obtaining order of protection, 2019). A final order of protection for five years can only be 
granted if a judge makes a finding that exigent circumstance exist, trial and would typically 
include language like “You are prohibited from going near the Petitioner, committing acts of 
stalking, harassment, assault et al.” (Steps for obtaining order of protection, 2019). Protection 
orders and restraining orders, temporary and final, were found to be significantly effective in a 
study of 210 women in 2010 (Logan  & Walker, 2010, p.339).
Obtaining a protection order in India, on the other hand, is procedurally different 
(OPWDVA, 2005). Women are asked to inform Protection Officers if they believe or have reason 
to believe that any act of violence has occurred, the Protection Officer then is the one who makes 
a “Domestic Incident Report” to a magistrate after informing the woman of her rights 
(OPWDVA, 2005, p.222). These are some of the ways Indian law differs from United States in 
terms of domestic violence protection. 
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Consequences of violating a protection order, temporary or final, can be serious in both 
countries and action taken can be swift. A study in 2002 found that a in the U.S., a permanent 
protection order was associated with an 80% reduction in  “police reported violence” in the 
subsequent year (Holt, et al., 2002; Benitez, C. T., et al., 2010, p.378). Since an order of 
protection is a judicial order, violators would be in criminal contempt of court. As 
aforementioned, full faith and credit provisions give power to state courts to determine whether 
protection orders are necessary. Since this research is conducted in New York, under New York 
law, if a person contacts someone who has an order of protection against them whether by phone 
or email, it is a class A misdemeanor, punishable by one year in jail (NYPL §  215.50 (3)). If they 
commit criminal contempt in the first degree by intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
endangering someone who has an order of protection, or making them fearful of physical injury, 
they can be sentenced up to four years in prison under New York law (NYPL §  215.51 (b)). With 
potential jail time in the balance, abusers arguably would be deterred under the rational choice 
theory because rationally, the consequence of spending four years in jail should far outweigh the 
crime of threatening a spouse (Akers, 1990). In India, a breach of an order of protection could 
lead to imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of twenty thousand Indian rupees 
(Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act, 2005, §  31).  
The research aims of this study is to examine how socio-criminological factors affect the 
enactment of legislation in the domestic violence legislative landscape of the United States and 
India. India was chosen as a comparison for this study because of the cultural differences, 
specifically pertaining to families, relationships, and the role of personal religion based laws, 
police and courts in personal family matters. Moreover, as the population demographic in the 
United States is consistently becoming heterogenous, it is important to compare and contrast 
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legal codes to ensure that all persons are protected equally under the law. India is a good example 
of this because it has an extremely diverse population. Furthermore. the Muslim community in 
India follows their own set of personal laws, governed by the Quran.  The aims of this research 
will be achieved by doing a content analysis of the language and phrases in the statute with the 
intent to analyze the language, examine specific sections, identify diverging treatments of some 
offenses, discern prosecution strategies, tools and socio-cultural measures for the protection of 
women against intimate partner violence. 
The appropriate audience for this study would be prosecutors and lawmakers in both 
jurisdiction since this is an ongoing problem. This study hopes that a comparative analysis of the 
treatment of domestic violence under laws of two different countries where intimate partner 
violence is a major issue would shed new light on possible solutions or, least ways to reduce 
domestic violence. The fact that domestic violence rates are high in both countries despite 
significant cultural differences might illuminate new avenues for future research. Previous 
studies have comparatively analyzed Asian and European Countries (Quaid et al., 2013), State 
statute comparisons of protective order legislation (Eigenberg, et al., 2003). The other 
comparative study of domestic violence laws in the United States and India looks, traditional and 
ancient laws and makes comparisons on that basis (Goel, et al., 2016). This study aims to fill the 
gap by comparing two contemporary legal statutes, the federal level in the U.S. and the central 
level in India that went into effect very recently and are still in effect today. Specifically, the 
following research questions. Whether the two countries differ in the definition of actions 
considered domestic/ intimate partner violence and what is the source of the difference? Whether 
the two countries differ in punishments for domestic/ intimate partner violence? If so, what are 
the difference in punishment and what are the different tools legally available to victims?
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The study will be prefaced by a literature review of prior domestic violence research, a 
discussion section and a conclusory chapter. The discussion section will use data from a specially 
designed coding instrument that categorizes code section paragraphs to identify whether the 
paragraphs include information about reporting ability,  be organized in five parts, the first part 
will look, variations in definitions, which will look, the definitional sections of both statues and 
analyze the difference in language used.  It will look, what offenses are considered domestic 
violence and how cultural differences influenced lawmakers. The second part will compare the 
tools given to law enforcement agencies against perpetrators of violence. The third part will 
analyze the sentences allowed for perpetrators under the statutes and judicial discretion in 
sentencing in domestic violence cases. The fourth part will surmise landmark case law on the 
subject from both countries to compare how past domestic violence prosecution has played out in 
the past. The final part will summarize the study, make policy arguments and final comments.
Literature Review
As stated in the previous section, domestic violence is an important subject for research 
because of its pervasiveness and its presence in both well developed first world countries and 
lesser developed third world countries. This section looks, the past quantitative and qualitative 
research in this field to further understand the problem, on the path to proposing possible 
solutions. It is divided into three subsections. The first section looks at global statistics of 
domestic violence. The next section examines prior research surrounding protective orders and is 
useful to formulate an appropriate methodology for this research. The final section looks, a 
global content analysis of domestic violence and divorce statutes.
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This literature review is in preparation for an analysis of New York domestic violence 
statutes as defined under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), New York Consolidated 
Laws, Article 6-A, § 459-A,  the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Reauthorization 
Act in 2013, and the  Indian statute titled “Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act 
of 2005” (PWDVA) which applies to all states in the Republic of India, specifically the state of 
Maharashtra and specifically, the city of Mumbai. With the PWDVA, the Dowry Prohibition Act 
(DPA),prohibits the demanding, giving and taking of “Dowry” during marriage (Dowry 
Prohibition Act of 1961), sexual harassment of women at the workplace, arguably an 
interpersonal violence crime is governed by the Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace 
(Prohibition, Prevention, and Redressal) Act of 2013 (SHWWA). § 498A and § 304 B of the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and § 174 and § 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(CRPC) are in the legislative landscape of domestic violence law in India. In 2013, Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Act of 2013 amended some of the provisions on rape (§ 375) of the IPC. 
Some state level domestic violence crimes in the State of New York are in the New York 
Consolidated Laws, Penal Laws (PEN) § 120.10 (1)-(4), “Assault in the third degree”, PEN § 
120.13 “Menacing in the First Degree”, PEN §  245.15 “Unlawful Dissemination or Publication 
of an Intimate Image” PEN § 120.60 “Stalking in the first degree”, PEN §  121.11 “Criminal 
Obstruction of breathing or blood circulation” (Strangulation). 
United States and India Statistics of Domestic Violence 
Truman & Morgan’s (2014)  research of nonfatal domestic violence between 2003 and 
2014 in the United States found that domestic violence accounted for 21% of all violent crimes. 
According to their research, intimate partner violence was more prevalent than other forms of 
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family violence (Truman & Morgan, 2014, p.). Black, et al., 2011 found 18.3% women in the 
United States were victims of rape at least once in their lifetimes (Black, et al., 2011, p. 18). 
16.2% of women in the United States furthermore were victims of stalking at least once in their 
lifetime (p. 29). A majority of stalking occurred in the form of unwanted phone calls (78.8%) 
(p.31). Finally, 32.9% of women experienced physical violence in their lifetimes (p.38).  Though 
there are no known figures on the percent of violent crimes in India, the National Family Health 
Survey, 2007 (N= 198,754) found that 34% of women between 15 and 49 had experiences physi-
cal violence and 9% of women had experienced sexual violence as of September 2007 (Mari 
Bhat, et al., 2007, p. xlvi). Thirty seven percent of women who were ever married experienced 
spousal physical abuse while 16% of women experienced emotional abuse (Mari Bhat, et al., 
2007, p. xlvi). Northern Indian states had both the highest and lowest percentages of women who 
have experienced physical and sexual violence with a 6% in Himachal Pradesh while 56% in Bi-
har (Mari Bhat, et al., 2007, p. xlvi). This report also found that 85% of women who experienced 
sexual violence never reported it to law enforcement, compared to 56% unreported cases in the 
United States (Mari Bhat, et al., 2007, p. xlvii; Truman & Morgan, 2014, p.1). Thirty four point 
six percent of women who are muslim have experienced physical violence in India since the age 
of 15 (Mar Bhat, et al., p 498).  Forty four point five percent women in the lowest wealth index 
experienced more physical violence since age 15 compared to 19.2% women in the highest 
wealth index (Mari Bhat, et al., p 498). Even though the percentages of women who experience 
domestic violence varies dramatically between wealth groups, it should be noted that even at the 
highest wealth group, domestic violence is prevalent. 
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 A meta analysis of 137 quantitative studies on domestic violence from 2004 to 2015 in 
India, found that the median for lifetime estimates of women who experience physical abuse was 
29%, psychological abuse was 29%, and sexual abuse was 12% (Kalokhe, et al. 2013,, p. 503). 
They found certain gaps in the existing research and posited that future studies could focus on 
domestic violence and correlates in the cross sectional research to develop future strategies of 
prevention and deliver effective supportive services (Kalokhe, et al. 2013,, p. 504). They con-
cluded that research was lacking in domestic violence experiences of older women and women in 
same-sex marriages or cohabiting with partners and violence by perpetrators other than spouses 
and intimate partners (Kalokhe, et al. 2013,, p. 509). Finally, they found the need for a “cultural-
ly tailored violence scale and intervention geared towards prevention and management of vio-
lence” (Kalokhe, et al. 2013,, p. 509).   
Domestic Violence and Protection Orders
In the United States, all fifty states have some form of protection order that are issued by 
the family court to protect the petitioner from further abuse by the defendant (Findlaw, n.d.). 
Arguably, protection orders are sometimes the first line of defense to protect victims of domestic 
abuse. More often than not, domestic violence happens in the privacy of a residence and unlike 
crimes like burglary, larceny, homicide, the effects are often invisible. Evidence is difficult to 
obtain and prosecution requires reporting on the part of the victim, which is also difficult because 
victims fear the consequences of reporting and they fear future victimization. 
The routine activities theory, first developed by Cohen & Felson 1979  states that a 
motivated offender, a vulnerable target, and the lack of a suitable guardian must converge, a time 
and place for crime to occur (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Even though it has been previously argued 
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that this theory does not explain interpersonal crimes, this research paper argues that there is a 
convergence of the three elements of routine activities theory in the crime of domestic violence. 
The abuser is the motivated offender, the vulnerable target is the victim and the nature of the 
venue of the crime, i.e., a private residence means that there is no suitable guardian present. If 
the abuser (husband) is hitting the victim (wife) in the presence of minor children, nobody else is 
present in the home who can protect the victim. In cases like these, protective orders are essential 
to protect victims and serve as a suitable guardian, reducing instances of domestic violence. 
Protection orders are enforced by law and violations carry with them legal penalties and are 
enforced by the law.
In New York, the Family Court Act § 154-d defines protection orders as an order issued 
ex-parte upon the petition of one party who alleges that the family court is not is session, a 
family offense was committed and a family offense petition was filed in family court (Family 
Court Act § 154-d). Furthermore, the petitioner must show good cause for the petition to be filed. 
Protection orders generally include “No Contact Provisions”, “Peaceful contact Provisions”, 
“Stay Away Provisions”, “Move out provisions”, “Surrender fire arms provision” and/ or 
“Counseling Provisions”. Not all protection orders include all provision, the court makes a 
factual determination as to which provision apply (Findlaw, n.d.). 
	 Finn and Colson’s 1990 report is the earliest quantitative study examined here that 
conducts a comparative content analysis of protection order laws within the United States. This 
report focused on the constitutionality of civil protection orders, statutory bases, the petitioning 
process, various types of relief, and how judges issued and enforce protection orders across the 
United States (Finn & Colson, 1990, pg. v).  Further they examine procedural bases including the 
eligibility of the petitioner, the types of behavior covered, procedure for issuing permanent 
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orders, standard of proof, and a few common “statutory weaknesses” (Finn & Colson, 1990, p. 7 
to p. 18).  
 They found that in 48 states tested, all states allowed spouses to petition, all except 
Alabama and Minnesota would allow a former spouse to petition for civil protection orders while 
only four states permitted self defense (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 8). Furthermore, all forty nine 
states viewed physical abuse of an adult as qualifying behavior for an order while only thirty 
three states viewed physical abuse of a child as qualifying (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 13). Forty 
three states would allow a threat to warrant a protection order but only forty states would allow 
protection orders against someone who attempted physical violence (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 
13). While a few jurisdictions (11) state “preponderance of evidence” as a standard of proof and 
Maryland requiring a higher stand of “clear and convincing evidence”, most states statutes are 
silent on the standard of proof that must be met (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 14). They find filing 
fees, emergencies, monitoring, enforcement, and the short duration of the orders as some of the 
statutory weaknesses (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 15).  
 Among the statutes tested, further twenty three states had filing fees but twenty six states 
waive fees for indigent persons, thirty five states have special forms and twenty eight states have 
assistance available in filling out the forms, only thirty states allow pro se filing or filing without 
the assistance of a legal representative (Finn & Colson, 1990,, p. 21). The report is 
comprehensive in analyzing civil protection laws and provides starting point to formulating a 
similar instrument in this study (Finn & Colson, 1990). 
 Eigenberg (2003) built upon  Finn and Colson’s report and did a content analysis of the 
prevalent state statutes surrounding protective order legislation that was prevalent, the time to 
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“identify themes and concepts” in the written statutes by comparing each state statute and coded 
the findings on a coding sheet, specifically created for that purpose (Eigenberg, H., et. al., 2003, 
p. 414). They found, in all statutes tested, a victim could themselves file for a protection order 
but only in 54% an adult household member could petition on behalf of a child (p. 414).  Current 
spouses could file for protection orders in 45 states while 47 states allowed former spouses to file 
for orders (p. 415). 30 states allowed  unmarried “cohabiters” to file while 29 states allowed 
former cohabiters to file, 41 states allowed persons with children in common to file (p. 415). 
Across the board, newer laws in 2003, provided greater access to victims and expanded the 
eligible populations who could obtain protective orders (Eigenberg, H., et. al., 2003, p. 419).  
 While the prior studies focused on the legal statues, Keilitz, 1997 and Benitez, 2010, 
looked, the effectiveness of protection orders (Keilitz, 1997,, p. 2;  Benitez, 2010,, p.336). Both 
Keilitz and Benitez used individual levels of measurement with a review of court documents, 
police reports, victim and defendant interviews, and random telephonic interviews (Keilitz, 
1997,, p. 2; Benitez, 2010,, p. 337). Keilitz primarily examined the benefits of civil protection 
orders based on then recent legislative developments, specifically the congressional enactment of 
the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, the federal level in the United States  
(Keilitz, 1997, p. 16).   
 To measure the success of protection orders Keilitz used improvement of quality of life, 
victims feeling better, and victims feeling safer while Bentiez study in 2010 used the rate of 
violation of orders to measure success (Keilitz, 1997, p. 5; Benitez, 2010,, p.384). Keilitz found 
protection orders to significantly improve the quality of life of its participants among all three 
jurisdictions, the followup interview (Delaware 87.5%; Denver 89.7%; D.C. 79.4%)   ( 
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Keilitz, 1997,, p. 5). Benitez concluded that available research showed that protection orders did 
reduce the risk of violence towards the victim (Benitez, 2010,, p.385). Further, the effectiveness 
of protection orders depended on interpretation of the word protection, most studies used 
reduction in violation rates as a measure of success but found that that rate “varied widely among 
the studies researched” (Benitez, 2010,, p. 384). Studies before 2002 found this rate to vary 
widely from three percent to seventy-nine percent with a mean of 40 percent (Benitez, 2010,, p. 
384). This research found that the there was a significant chance of violation of protective orders 
“soon after its initiation, and stalking raised the risk of violation”.   
 Another study in the United States found a significant reduction in abuse and violence 
among victims in a study of 210 women over the age of 18, who had only one protective order 
against the male offender, they had to complete a “baseline interview”, 6 weeks  (Logan & Walk-
er, 2010, p.332). The participants were initially interviewed and then a follow-up was conducted, 
the three month and six month mark (p. 335). There was a reduction in violation of protection 
orders for half the sample population and even if violations occurred, violence and abuse were 
significantly reduced (p. 343). Moreover the perception of safety among women who had protec-
tion orders also increased (p. 343). Finally this study found that stalking was one of the major 
ways in which protection orders were violated (p. 343).  
 However, the results of this study were not uniformly positive as for those who had a fear 
of stalking, the protection order provided little to no protection as stalking did not decrease after 
the protection order was obtained (p. 344). Stalking further proved to have a “unique impact on 
the mental health of the victim” and cause higher levels of victim fear while lower levels of vic-
tim perception of protection by the order (p. 344). Reduction of fear of future harm proved to be 
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effective in raising victim confidence in the protective order but the limited follow-up duration 
gave the researchers little information on the relationships (p. 344). A longer follow-up duration 
would provide more information on how relationships change and a combination of official data 
with self reported data could lead to different results (p. 345). The research posited that future 
research could focus on how and why protective orders work (p. 345).  
 An important element of protection order legislation is who has access to petition for 
such an order. Greenlees, 2012, examined the state of protection for domestic partners who were 
not spouses and although most if not all states provided protections against violence to spouses, 
some states have not extended that level of protection to dating partners (Greenlees, 2012,, p. 
681). This study found that states typically either provide protections but do not define ‘dating 
relationships, provide protections and definitions of ‘dating relationships’, provide a list of fac-
tors to help assist the judge in deciding whether a ‘dating relationship’ exists, or does not provide 
any protections, all (p. 681). This study proposes that states should enact a statute to include pro-
tections for persons in dating relationships, solid definitions of dating relationships and judges 
should determine whether dating relationships exist based on a totality of the “circumstances” 
and factors such as the length of the relationship, frequency of interaction between the partners, 
expectations of the relationship, and whether the couple “held out to be in a relationship” (p. 
686). Greenlees concluded that there is a need for “consistent and broad statutory scheme” to 
provide uniform protections for all persons (p. 687).  
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Domestic Violence and Divorce  
 The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, governs the union of persons of persons of the Hindu re-
ligion, as the name suggests. Article 44 of the Constitution of India, a non-binding “Directive 
Principle of State Policy” calls “to secure a uniform civil code” for all citizens, however the 
Constitution  also protects the fundamental right to freedom to it’s citizens (Constitution of India, 
1950, Art. 44; Shahnaz, 2015). Courts have typically given much weight to this fundamental 
freedom, specifically in Shastri Yagnapurush Das Ji v. Muldas Bandar Das Vaishya, 1996, the  
Supreme Court of India held that the practice of religion included ceremonies, practices and rites 
which are essential for the practice of religion and the State can’t interfere in the exercise of 
these rights except they are contrary to public order, health and morality (Shastri Yagnapurush 
Das Ji v. Muldas Bandar Das Vaishya, 1996; Shahnaz, 2015). Marriage and Divorce rules in In-
dia are deeply intertwined with religious practices and implementing a uniform civil code would 
infringe on the Religious freedoms of citizens (Shahnaz, 2015).  
 While protection orders is often the first line of defense as aforementioned, a more per-
manent solution, invariably is getting the victim away from the influence and control of the 
abuser. Here, divorces play an important role. Generally, a divorce means the dissolution of a 
marriage and a complete separation of both parties (The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 13). Once 
a protection order is filed, typically the next step is divorce. Divorces can be o btained, universal-
ly on the grounds of abandonment, where one party has completely abandoned another, adultery, 
separation which can be by agreement of parties or judicial separation upon a court order. Di-
vorces can be no fault and finally, more relevant to the current study divorces can be obtained on 
the ground that one party has treated the other in a cruel or unusual manner. In New York, a di-
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vorce is only granted after all other issues of custody, visitation, maintenance, child support, and 
equitable distribution are settled. Most of those requirements pertain to minor children, irrelevant 
to the current study.  
 The issue of equitable distribution for divorce is relevant here. Equitable distribution, as 
the name suggests is equal (50/50) distribution of any property, obtained by the parties during the 
marriage. It is relevant in domestic violence cases because in case the abuser (husband) is the 
party with more resources, and the victim (wife) files for divorce for abuse, equitable distribution 
ensures that the victim is not destitute after divorce. In New York, the party with lesser resources 
can also claim maintenance and maintenance can be collected by a special “Support Collection 
Unit” (SCU) so that there is no contact between parties. This is important because it ensures that 
violent offenders do not have any contact with their victims.  
 In most cases, getting a divorce is effective to protect women from further abuse by re-
moving them from bad situations, and ensuring that they do not become destitute. However, what 
if women, specifically, cannot obtain a divorce. Muslims face exceedingly strict conditions for 
divorce and in some instances, Muslim women are denied the right to obtain divorces even if 
they have been victims of abuse, the hands of their significant others (Gleeson & Baird, 2018). 
Gleeson & Baird (2018) explores how a Muslim woman in Australia was unable to obtain a di-
vorce even though she had a recording of the abuse she received from her significant other 
(Gleeson & Baird, 2018). This example demonstrates the complex intermingling of Muslim per-
sonal law and state law, especially when it comes to Muslim women. Although the woman in that 
community was able to get a civil divorce, the article points out that without a religious divorce, 
the woman was still married in the eyes of the community (Gleeson & Baird, 2019). Muslim per-
Page  of 18 76
CRJ-791: DomViol-Draft1
sonal law makes the situation of the Australian women similar to many women in India. It is rel-
evant because it was reported, Australia being more developed than India, this was reported. It is 
likely that numerous women in India are in the same position unable to get a divorce and unable 
to report it for fear of communal consequences.  
 Narain, 2005, focused on Women’s Rights in post colonial India, with specific focus on 
the position of Muslim women in the community (Narain, 2005,, p. 93). She found that in the 
1930s, Muslim religious identity became a crucial factor in the political system and while the 
women’s movement tried to be inclusive of all women, including Muslim women, religious iden-
tity soon took center stage over gender identity (p. 95). She further examined the role of gender 
identity and religious identity, especially among women in the struggle for independence and 
how in today’s society, the voices of women and their needs are silenced in favor of caricatural 
representation of women as victims (p. 99). This overarching theme of Muslim women being 
governed by repressive paternalistic personal laws effects all facets of the lives of these women 
including access to redressal in domestic violence cases.  
 Rahiman 1986, looks, the history and evolution of Muslim personal law in India (Rahi-
man, 1986). Historically, the personal lives of Muslim women in India was strictly governed by 
Muslim personal laws which gave men a lot of power over women in the realm of marriage and 
divorce (p. 257). Section 2 of the Shariat Act of 1937 governs marriages and divorces among 
Muslims (p. 257). The Muslim law currently followed in India today has been perverted from its 
original source (p. 262) which allows for polygamy among Muslim men and the power to di-
vorce wives by three utterances of the word “talaq” or divorce in Urdu (p. 262). Even though the 
Quran requires the utterances to be spoken across three months, giving the couple time to reflect 
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and reconcile, the modern practice is three utterances in a single breath which is “contrary to 
quranic dictates” (p. 262). This ostensibly gives Muslim men an upper hand because there is no 
recourse against divorce for the wife, Muslim women live in constant fear and accept abuse for 
the fear that they would be destitute if their husbands divorced them. 
 Lemons, 2018, researched the relationship between Islamic tribunals and state courts in 
the states of Bihar and Delhi, India (Lemons, 2018). She argues that islamic tribunals act as a 
legally plural entity that does the work of the state courts (p. 626). Particularly she looks, the role 
of Muslim sharia courts (dar ul qazas), which the Supreme Court of India held were subservient 
to state courts and any decision of such a court that contradicted the constitution were to be ig-
nored (p. 603). The Indian parliament has very recently banned the practice of “triple-talaq, giv-
ing some amount of power back to Muslim women, despite backlash from community leaders 
(Das, S., 2019). The police in India now have the power to arrest any offender without a warrant 
and imprison them for a period of three years (Das, 1019).   
 Hajjar, 2004, focuses on domestic violence in Muslim communities in the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia and puts forth a framework for comparative analysis that emphsizes sharia state 
law, intra-family violence and struggles over women’s rights (Hajjar, 2004,, p. 4). Muslim 
women are uniquely, risk in terms of domestic violence because state law is resistant to regard 
domestic violence as state law deters even those states which provide robust protections and 
women’s rights from implementing a strong and active legal solutions (p. 5). Although the Con-
vention of Elimination against all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was 
adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly, it did not explicitly recognize the vio-
lence against women as a human rights violation, which led to the UN Declaration on Elimina-
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tion of Violence Against Women in 1993 (p. 13). The success of this campaign however only 
lead to further counter efforts to empowerment of women (p. 14).  
 This research analyzes Muslim communities and domestic violence, focusing is on 
“communalization” where religious laws are given semi-autonomy by the state, “nationalization” 
where national laws incorporate or are influenced by religious laws, and “theocratization” where 
national laws are based on religious laws (p. 20). India follows the nationalization model where 
although the state laws are non-religious, Muslim law is communalized as far as family law is 
concerned, and only for minorities, which has given ride to intense debate (p. 21). The conflict of 
supremacy over state law and religious law has existed since independence but flared up in 1985 
after the Shah Bano case wherein the Supreme Court of India held that a Muslim woman was 
entitled to maintenance under the criminal procedure code, after her husband left her destitute by 
refusing to pay maintenance (p. 22). This case led to the enactment of the Muslim Women [Pro-
tection of Rights in Divorce] Act which reaffirmed the supremacy of Muslim law (p. 22). The 
institution of the Uniform Civil Code, a state law that would formally separate religious law and 
state law has also been widely contested since 1947 (p. 22).   
 A number of criminal laws that protect women from dowry harassment and bride burning 
do not apply to Muslim women because they are superseded by religious law (p. 23). This article 
is important because the latest census data shows that a significant portion of the Indian Popula-
tion (13.4%) is Muslim (Orgi, n.d.). Further it effectively demonstrates the difficulty in legisla-
tive intervention in India due to this complex web of state law and religious law.  
 In recent years, Indian family law has undergone certain changes as observed in Subra-
manian, 2008 (Subramanian, 2008,, p. 637). For one, common law judges are more well versed 
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in traditional, transnational islamic law, traditions and recent “reformist interpretations of these 
traditions” due to legal mobilization “within and beyond Muslim communities” (p. 665). These 
changes, for the first time led to partial convergence is religious marriage and divorce laws 
among Muslims, Hindus, and Christians in India but Muslim law still comes from a very differ-
ent jurisprudential background so the partial convergence, he would would not likely lead to a 
homogeneity in personal law (p. 666) 
  In summary, domestic violence has been and continues to be a pervasive global issue 
with little divergence globally. There are a few remedies against domestic violence, protection 
orders and divorce are among them. Some studies have found women empowerment, feminism 
and more participation of women in non-agricultural labor markets, especially in eastern coun-
tries led to a decrease in domestic violence against women but to the contrary, that also gave rise 
to instances of wives beating husbands. Other studies found acculturation and assimilation into 
western cultures was somewhat effective in changing attitudes towards wife-beating among men 
of South Asian descent while peer-groups formed as a result of that acculturation was more ef-
fective in changing attitudes.   
 Past research in protection order legislation in the United States has found that protection 
order services are widely available to most domestic partners but dating partners require the 
same level of protection against violence as spouses and cohabiting partners. Obtaining a protec-
tion order in India is markedly more complicated and involves a protection officer petitioning the 
court on behalf of a victim.  
 Muslim women, especially in India, face unique challenges when it comes to protection 
from domestic violence because of Muslim personal laws which govern family and marital rights 
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of women. Muslim personal law is repressive and gives a lot of power to Muslim men over 
women. Men can unilaterally divorce women, they practice polygamy, and Muslim women have 
to be subservient to men. Although some civil remedies may be available to women, the overar-
ching islamic traditional law makes their lives difficult and puts them in a trapped position in 
cases of domestic abuse where they might have no recourse but to accept the abuse.  
Partial History of Domestic Violence Legislation  
A report on the landscape of domestic violence legislation  internationally found that there was 
an explicit domestic violence law in most Asian countries, Kenya, Poland and Ukraine. Surpris-
ingly, England and Wales, France, Germany, and the Czech Republic in Europe did not have sep-
arate laws on domestic violence but included domestic violence provisions in their criminal 
codes (Quaid, et al., 2013, p. 6). Only married/ heterosexual couples were included in the defini-
tion of domestic violence in China, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Singapore, and Vietnam while Eu-
ropean countries, Russia and Rwanda extended protections under domestic violence to non-mar-
ried/ non-heterosexual couples (Quaid, et al., 2013, p. 6). All countries examined except Laos, 
North Korea, and Ukraine provided temporary/ interim measures to victims. China, North Korea, 
Russia and Singapore were the only countries that did not have support available to victims 
(Quaid, et al., 2013, p. 6).    
 In the United States, the history of the Violence Against Women Act dates back to 1990, 
when it was first drafted (History of VAWA, n.d.). The most controversial provision of the bill 
was the private civil rights remedy which allowed victims of domestic violence to bring a private 
suit against their attackers (History of VAWA, n.d.). Congress passed the bill with this provision 
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under the commerce clause of the constitution, arguing that gender-motivated instances of vio-
lence had a great impact on the taxpayer in terms of healthcare expenses (History of VAWA, 
n.d.). Chief Justice Rhienquest however struck down this provision in United States v. Morrison, 
2000, saying that the provision would bring many domestic disputes within the purview of the 
court when these matters did not belong there ((United States v. Morrison, 2000; History of 
VAWA, n.d.).  
 Senator Joe Biden supported the original federal Violence Against Women Act, 1994 and 
voiced the need for domestic violence legislation, the federal level (Biden, 1993, p. 1059).  He 
argued that violence against women was not a private matter but a public tragedy that crosses 
disciplines from public heath to education and criminal justice (p. 1059). He accepted that legis-
lation cannot change public attitudes directly but hoped that it would alert the public to the seri-
ous harm (p. 1060).  
 Berney in 2015 conducted a policy analysis of the Violence Against Women Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2013 which reauthorized the original act. The policy analysis looked, the policy ob-
jectives, implications and value sets of those in favor of and opposed to the reauthorization of the 
act (Berney, 2015, p. 1). This study conducted a policy analysis using a theoretical policy analy-
sis framework to analyze the statute (p. 27). This framework included questions ranging from a 
definition of the problem to the objectives of the policy and the social implications of the policy 
(p. 29). A similar framework was developed by  Gimenez (   ) in her book “Social Policy and 
Social Change: Toward the Creation of Social and Economic Justice” (p. 27). She found that the 
2013 reauthorization act was “ambitious and provided protections for previously marginalized 
communities” (p. 47). Further, the inclusion of LGBT protections, and the “expansion of tribal 
Page  of 24 76
CRJ-791: DomViol-Draft1
sovereignty” goes a long way in providing such protections to marginalized populations (p. 47). 
Some limitations of the research were researcher bias and limited research as to the policy impli-
cations of the reauthorization act (p. 48). However, VAWA Reauthorization is important and long 
term research would go a long way to capture some of the effects of the act (p. 48).    
 Although the debate around religion is fierce in the United States, the laws relating to 
domestic violence and divorce apply equally to people of all religions, this is markedly different 
from the system in India where Muslim women are governed by Muslim personal law as op-
posed to a common state law. The Overview of the Protection of Women against Domestic Vio-
lence Act of 2005 provides commentary on the Indian statute along with procedural steps to ob-
taining a protection order against an offender (OPWDVA, 2005,, p. 220). This is a civil law, de-
signed to provide redressal and relief to the aggrieved party (p. 220). This article discusses a 
framework for appointment, tenure, and duties of protection officers, service providers and coun-
selors (OPWDVA, 2005).  
 The Lawyers Collective Women’s Rights Initiative, 2009, conducted a study for the Unit-
ed Nations Development fund for Women on “Domestic violence statutes legislation, implemen-
tation based on international standards and good practices” (LCWRI, 2009). They found that ag-
gressive criminal justice reforms faced backlash as not taking the woman’s wishes into consider-
ation while civil remedies were wholly ineffectual in combating the issue of domestic violence in 
Asian countries (LCWRI, 2009,, p. 55). A combination of civil and criminal approaches has 
proven to be most effectual based on the needs of the country and cultural considerations (p. 55). 
Creating a Domestic Violence Response System is considered a “good practice” globally and 
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must be “understood from the perspective of a woman suffering from domestic violence because 
she needs a multiplicity of services, not limited to legal remedies” (p. 55).  
 Saxena, 2015, looked, the effectiveness of the Indian Protection of Women against Do-
mestic Violence Act using a “gendered impact analysis framework” and found that “judges were 
influential in impacting outcomes for women inside court and police” and impacted the out-
comes women faced (Saxena, 2015, p. v). The sample size for the study was 78 women from 
Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, three Indian states (p. v). The study further found that 
protection orders were only granted to a third of applicants and only women organizations and 
non-governmental organizations were the ones who provided “gender-sensitive support” to 
women (p. v). 37% of  the women reported that they were satisfied with the outcome, while the 
same percentage (37%) reported that they were not satisfied (p. v). Only 23% reported partial 
satisfaction (p. v).  
Reducing Domestic Violence Globally 
 Kaya & Cook, 2010, found that female empowerment in the field of education, participa-
tion in the labor market, and participation in non-agricultural sectors of employment reduced vio-
lence against women (Kaya & Cook, 2010, p. 436). Economic development also helps as long as 
women are able to participate in and benefit from such developments (p. 436). In a cultural con-
text, they found religious fractionalization to increase violence against women in certain situa-
tions but their study only considered forty countries, one point in time, which they pointed out 
was a limitation to the study (p. 436). This notion is partially supported by Archer, 2006, which 
found that as individualism and female development increased, there were more instances of vio-
Page  of 26 76
CRJ-791: DomViol-Draft1
lence against males (Archer, 2006,, p. 148). Finally he held that most research on gender vio-
lence among women was done is western countries and it was not an accurate representation of 
the present state of affairs (p. 150).  
 A study of the best practices while responding to domestic violence in the Indian states of 
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh found that effective intervention must include cultural speci-
ficity in design, wide ranging and diverse services, ample funding, collaboration, ethical and 
moral leadership, and community mobilization (Mitra, N., 1999,, p. 25). Furthermore, criminaliz-
ing violence, adopting a holistic approach, coordinating and institutionalizing responses, involv-
ing government agencies, improving current data, investing in public education campaigns might 
prove useful to provide better, more effective services (Mitra, N., 1999,, p. 26).  
Methodology
Content Analysis Method  
 The research question here is whether socio-cultural and socio-legal elements that affect 
the way statutes are enacted in a country are represented in the legislative landscape of that coun-
try. A unique feature of this comparative content analysis is the diversity in the demographics. 
The United States is becoming increasingly heterogenous in its population while India has al-
ways been diverse and heterogenous since its inception. How are the legal codes drafted differ-
ently as a result and how are instances of domestic violence treated differently under said legal 
codes. 
Content Analysis is the appropriate method for this research because the content analysis 
method provides an unobtrusive pathway to understanding bodies of text and inferring 
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definitions from such bodies(Weber, 1990). The unit of analysis in this case is code section 
paragraphs of specific legislations, which although does not have as high a validity as a smaller 
unit of analysis such as a sentence of a single word, nonetheless apt in this case because all 
statutes across the board are structured with the specific code sections which are easily 
identifiable and analyzable. 
Although the Weber model uses the coding method to quantify qualitative data, this study 
will approach the entire legislative landscape in strictly a qualitative manner. Code sections form 
primary sources of law relating to domestic violence will be collected and analyzed for meaning 
and intent. Each section will then be compared to other sections, within and without it’s parent 
statute and it’s parent jurisdiction. The primary areas of focus here are distinctions in definition, 
distinctions in types of crimes and duration of sentences, legal and extra-legal remedies available 
to victims and distinctions between them. Further, this study will also examine a number of 
precedents where courts in both countries addressed the issue of domestic violence in civil and 
criminal and family contexts to begin exploration on the kinds of cases litigated and judicial 
interpretations applied. Finally this study will provide policy implications and conclusions.  
Data Sources and Sampling
This study compares the language of the Protection of Women Against Domestic Vio-
lence Act (Act 42 of 2005) (PWDVA) and the Violence against Women Act (1994) (VAWA). 
Both statutes are part of a larger legislative landscape of codified laws designed to protect 
women from interpersonal violence.  PWDVA is bolstered by § 304 B and § 498A in the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Section 174 and § 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 
(CRPC) prescribes the procedural requirements of police officers, protection officers and judicial 
magistrates. It is further bolstered by provisions in the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. Amend-
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ments introduced to the IPC and CRPC, titled the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013 
(CLA), criminalized acts of violence that were not previously criminalized. Specifically, § 354 of 
the IPC, dealing with rape was amended change the methods of penetration and to include more 
explicit acts that would be considered sexual assault. 
 Every statute in India, criminal of otherwise, contains  a title and extent section. This sec-
tion sets forth the title and jurisdiction where the statute is applicable. The phrase “this act shall 
be applicable to the whole of India, except the states of Jammu and Kashmir” appears in all title 
sections. For the purposes of this study, the State of Maharashtra is picked as the New York State 
counterpart. The IPC, CRPC, PWDVA, and other statutes in this data section has jurisdiction 
over domestic violence crimes in Maharashtra.  
 The DPA of 1961, The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006, Juvenile Justice (Care 
and Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2006,  Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses 
Act 2012 all focus on specific crimes and populations. These statutes were selected for their fo-
cus on aspects of family life and violence within families. A boolean search was conducted for 
“domestic violence statutes Maharashtra” on google.com and the portable digital format versions 
of the acts were obtained from the official website of the Maharashtra State Commission of 
Women of  the Government of Maharashtra. All acts are in the public domain and accessible 
through simple searches on google.com.     
 In the United States, the domestic violence legislative landscape is divided at two levels 
because of federalism. To conduct a content analysis with fidelity, statutes at the federal, state, 
and local level that protect women and children from violence must be taken into consideration 
because domestic violence in the United States is governed by state laws. At the federal level, 
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along with VAWA, the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, and Title XVII “Crimes 
Against Children” of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 will be con-
sidered. At the state level, in New York, the New York Consolidated Laws, Social Services Arti-
cle 6-A, Domestic Violence Prevention Act, some New York Penal Code .  
  A sample of code section paragraphs was drawn from the population of statutes for codi-
fication and analysis. This sample will be drawn to fit five categories, defined in the previous 
section. This sample will represent a cross-section of the legislative landscape and allow for a 
cross-sectional content analysis of the domestic violence. The selected code section paragraphs 
are: VAWA § 40002 (a) (8) “Definition of Domestic Violence”. New York Consolidated Laws, 
Article 6-A Domestic Violence Prevention Act §  459-A “Victims of Domestic Violence”. New 
York State level criminal laws related to domestic violence, considered here are PEN § 120.00 
“Assault in the third degree”, PEN §  245.15 “Unlawful Dissemination or Publication of an Inti-
mate Image”, PEN § 120.14 “Menacing in the second degree”, PEN § 120.45 “Stalking in the 
fourth degree”, PEN § 121.11 “Criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation” New York 
Consolidated Laws, Family Court Act § 812 “Procedures to Obtain Protection Orders”. This sec-
tion provides legal remedies for domestic violence victims in New York State and finally PEN § 
70.15 is referred to for the sentence duration of offenses.  
 PWDVA §  2 (a) “Definition of aggrieved person”, §  3 (a) “Definition of Domestic Vio-
lence”, §  8 (1) “Appointment of Protection Officers”, §  9 (1) “Powers and Duties of Protection 
Officers”, §  12 (1) “Application to Magistrate”. DPA § 2 Definition of Dowry, §  3 (1) “Penalty 
for Giving or Taking Dowry”. As mentioned previously, criminal law in India is primarily gov-
erned by the IPC. Within the penal code, § 498A, “Husband or relative of husband of a women 
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subjecting her to cruelty” first made domestic violence a criminal offense in 1983. §304 B 
“Dowry Death” creates a special class of homicide victims. § 326A on acid attacks, § 354 “Sexu-
al Harassment and punishment for Sexual harassment”, § 375, “Rape” are some of the crimes 
that will be analyzed for this study.  
 For legal precedents in the United States, the “LexisNexis” database was accessed 
through the John Jay Lloyd Sealy Library website. Indian cases were accessed by using search 
terms such as “domestic violence cases”, “domestic violence cases mumbai” and “domestic vio-
lence cases Bombay High Court”. Mumbai City was renamed from Bombay. Compared to the 
transparency of the United States Court System and the free availability of court decisions, find-
ing corresponding decisions in India proved more difficult than anticipated. The meta analysis 
Krishnan, 2015, was relied on, as a source for the previous Indian Supreme Court and Delhi 
High Court cases to provide a glimpse of the effectiveness of the statute. Relevant cases included 
in that meta analysis, in addition to boolean searches.  
 For this precedent analysis, the cases relied on for New York State were Second Depart-
ment Appellate Division decisions: Matter of Rodriguez v. Guerra, (2006). 28 A.D.3d 775, Mat-
ter of Aliyah T. (Jaivon T.), (2019). 174 A.D.3d 722, and Felty v. Felty (2013). 108 A.D.3d 705. 
Other than these cases, this study has also made use of United States v. Butler , 297 U.S. 1 
(1936). The legal precedents in India, used here are Kamlesh Devi v. Jaipal  & Ors., 2019 and 
State of West Bengal v. Dipak Haldar & Anr, 2009.  
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DISCUSSION 
PART I- STRUCTURE, JURISDICTION, AND DIFFERENCES IN THE DEFINITION 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE   
 Structurally, VAWA is divided into seven “subtitles”, each focusing on a different aspect 
of safety for women. These “subtitles” include safe streets for women, safe homes for women, 
civil rights for women, equal justice for women in the Court Act, Violence Against Women Act 
Improvements, National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction, and Protections for Battered 
Immigrant Women and Children. Meanwhile, PWDVA is divided into four “Chapters”. These 
include Preliminary Definitions, Domestic Violence, Powers and Duties of Protection Officers, 
Service Providers, Procedures for obtaining orders and reliefs, and Miscellaneous.  
Domestic Violence definitions in the United States 
 Senator and current presidential candidate Joe Biden, in his congressional response in 
support of VAWA, argued for a national response to violence against women by creating new 
federal laws for crimes, providing funding for services for victims of domestic violence, educat-
ing judges, law enforcement officers and other stakeholders and finally providing legal remedy 
for victims of violence based on gender discrimination (Biden, 1993). PWDVA was enacted in 
2005 by the Indian parliament “to provide more effective protection for the rights of women, 
guaranteed under the Constitution”., an external source had to be consulted to understand the 
purpose of VAWA while a declarative statement outlining the purpose and jurisdiction of PWD-
VA is made at the outset.  
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 Under the definitions section of VAWA, domestic violence is defined as felony or misde-
meanor crimes committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of a victim, by a per-
son who shares a child in common with the victim, who cohabits or has cohabited with the vic-
tim in the past, by a person “similarly situated as a spouse in a jurisdiction that is receiving grant 
monies”, or “any other person against an adult or youth victim who is protected from the persons 
acts under domestic violence or family laws of that jurisdiction” [Violence Against Women Act 
of 1994, §  40002 (a) (8)]. The language  in this section is a microcosm of U.S. Federalism and 
U.S. Constitutional Law.       
 Domestic Violence crimes under VAWA could both be felony crimes, carrying a prison 
term of one year or more or misdemeanor crimes, with a prison term of up to one year. This sec-
tion uses the term “crimes” without going defining any specific crime and contains within itself a 
list of domestic violence offenders- current spouses, former spouses, intimate partners who were 
never legally married to the victim, co-parent of a child in common, person living with the victim 
or who lived with the victim in the past. The section is gender neutral and a victim could be of 
either gender, in this way VAWA is not limited to solely women. Further, the phrase  “similarly 
situated as a spouse in a jurisdiction receiving grant monies” is a legislative work of art. This 
phrase must be divided into “similarly situated as a spouse” and “jurisdiction receiving grant 
monies”. The first half of the phrase serves as a catch all for any interpersonal violence offender 
who may be in a domestic relationship with a victim other than those relationships explicitly 
mentioned in §  40002 (a) (8). In 2020, this phrase could also apply to victims of domestic vio-
lence who are lesbian, gay, transsexual, or gender non-conforming.   
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 The second half of the phrase “jurisdiction receiving grant monies” refers to Congress’s 
spending powers. Renz, 1999, examined the form and function of the Taxing and Spending 
Clause of Congress that was prescribed in Article 1, §  8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitu-
tion (Renz, 1999). In United States v. Butler, 1936, the Hughes Court held that the spending 
clause was restricted to be used only for the general welfare of the people (p. 83). As states have 
the authority to legislate what crimes are domestic violence crimes in their jurisdictions, separate 
from the jurisdiction of the federal government, Congress attempts to use its spending power in-
centivize states receiving federal grants to cover all victims of domestic violence. Although the 
Butler case limited Congress’s taxing and spending power, the use of that power here to protect 
victims of domestic violence falls well within the “general welfare” requirement set by the 
Supreme Court.  
 The final phrase of §  40002 (a) (8) of VAWA, “any other person against an adult or youth 
victim who is protected from the persons acts under domestic violence or family laws of that ju-
risdiction” similarly recognizes the states authority to legislate on domestic violence crimes and 
protect certain classes of vulnerable populations and it explicitly covers “youth victims”.  
 In New York State, Social Services law (SOS), Article 6-A § 459-A to § 459-H is the 
Domestic Violence Prevention Act. § 459-A defines “Victims of Domestic Violence” as any per-
son over the age of 16, any married person or any parent along with their minor children, where 
the person is a “victim of any act that would constitute a violation of penal law”, but not limited 
to disorderly conduct, harassment, aggravated harassment, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, 
sexual abuse, stalking, criminal mischief, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault, 
attempted assault, attempted murder, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, or 
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strangulation [Social Services Law (SOS) § 459-a]. These acts must have either physically or 
emotionally harmed the person or the child or put the person or child at substantial risk of physi-
cal or emotional harm [SOS § 459-a (1) (i)]. The acts must also have been committed by any per-
son who is related to the victim by consanguinity or affinity, legally married to the victim, for-
merly married to the victim, shares a child in common with the victim, persons who co-habitat in 
the same residence as the victim and her children, intimate partners of the victim regardless of 
cohabitation [SOS § 459-a (2)].  
 This definition creates a protected class of  minor children and their parents who live in 
the same residence as the aggressor/offender. The statute prohibits an aggressor from acting 
against the New York Penal Code. It also lists the specific domestic abuse actions. These include 
stalking, criminal mischief, sexual and physical assaults, menacing, and reckless endangerment 
among others. Some points of interest in this definition is the use of the phrase “but not limited 
to”, this acts as a catchall phrase for all other offenses that could make a victim feel unsafe. 
Criminal obstruction of breaking or blood circulation is simply another phrase for strangulation. 
Damages to victims covered under this definition include physical harm and emotional harm. 
Even the significant risk to emotional injury of is sufficient for an act to be classified as domestic 
abuse under the New York State definition. The aggressor could create an unsafe environment for 
the child. Child safety laws in New York State further supplement this   The term “emotional 
harm” is far reaching and any small act could have lasting psychological and emotional impact 
on a young child.   
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Domestic Violence in India, defined  
 The Indian equivalent to the state of New York is the State of Maharashtra. The state of 
Maharashtra follows the IPC and the CrPC. These mammoth, codified bodies of law predate the 
Constitution of India.  Long before the Constitution of India was ratified in 1950, The Charter 
Act of 1834 established the first law commission in India under the chairmanship of Lord 
Macaulay (Law Commission of India, n.d.). At the time India was a British colony, under Eng-
lish Common Law (Law Commission of India, n.d.). The Indian Penal Code in 1860 and the 
Criminal Procedure Code originally in 1861 were both passed under the recommendation of this 
commission, and adopted under the Indian Constitution after the Independence of India in 1947. 
These codified laws are still followed to this day. Maharashtra and by extension the city of 
Mumbai does not have separate criminal laws or  criminal procedure codes. 
  The IPC under § 498-A prescribes criminal penalties for domestic violence of-
fenders. Pandit, 2018 catalogs handily, some of the code sections pertaining to cruelty of women 
in India (Pandit, 2018). § 498A of the penal code punishes the husband, family of the husband or 
any other relative with a prison term of up to three years and a fine for subjecting the wife to cru-
elty. (Indian Penal Code, 1860). The term cruelty is further defined, for the purposes of the sec-
tion in subsection (a) as “any willful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave 
mental or physical injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman (Indian Penal Code, 
1860). Sub section (b) further states Harassment of a woman to with a view to “coerce her with 
an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security” or harassment as a result of failure to 
meet such unlawful demands (Indian Penal Code, 1860).  
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 The main emphasis of the language criminalizing domestic and family offenses in India is 
the effect on the woman. The phrase “willful conduct” relates to the mental state of the offender 
when committing the violent act. Such act must have been committed intentionally, requiring a 
nexus of the Mens Rea and the Actus Reus. Further, the effects of these acts, with specific men-
tion in the code section are “drive a woman to suicide” or “cause grave danger to life and limb”. 
This language is supported in the PWDVA and once again the criminal acts themselves are not 
exactly mentioned, only their effects. In sub section (b) of § 498A of the Indian Penal Code, we 
see a repeated reference to “demand for property or valuable security”. This is Dowry, the social 
evil that has become so deeply ingrained in Indian society and culture that three separate legisla-
tive acts criminalize the practice.  
 Pandit, 2018 further lists § 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972. The section titled, 
“Presumption of abatement of suicide by a married woman” states that it is presumed that the 
husband or relatives of the husband abetted in the suicide of the woman “if it is shown” that she 
committed suicide within the first seven years of marriage and the  
 Unlike the definitions of domestic violence and victims of domestic violence in the Unit-
ed States, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act of 2005 defines an aggrieved 
person only as a woman who has been in a domestic relationship with the abuser and alleges that 
they have been subjected to “any act of domestic violence by the abuser” [Protection of Women 
from Domestic Violence (Act 42 of 2005 § 2a)].  Section 3 of PWDVA provides the definition 
for domestic violence as “any act, omission or commission” that (a) harms, injures, or endangers 
the health, limb, safety, whether physical or mental, including physical abuse, sexual abuse, ver-
bal, emotional and economic abuse (b) Any act aforementioned, committed with the motivation 
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to coerce the woman or any other person related to her to meet an “unlawful demand for dowry. 
(c) Any act aforementioned that results in threatening the woman or her family and (d) any act 
that otherwise causes physical or mental harm to the woman [Protection of Women from Domes-
tic Violence (Act 42 of 2005 § 3a-§ 3d)].  
 Note that the Indian definition of a person aggrieved and acts that constitute domestic vi-
olence applies only to women. Compared to the state and federal domestic violence law of the 
United States, male victims have not been protected under this act. Furthermore, as mentioned 
previously, unlike the code section relating to domestic violence protection in the United States 
that lists specific actions that are considered domestic violence offenses, the version of the code 
section in India focuses on the harm caused by these actions rather than the actions themselves. 
These external effects and consequences include physical or mental harm, the possibility of 
physical or mental harm.  It also mentions that any act that results in a coercive effect on the 
woman’s birth parents and forces them to meet unlawful demands of dowry form the man’s fami-
ly also is an act of domestic violence. This illustrates the seriousness of the dowry demand prob-
lem in India.  
A Primer on the Indian Dowry System 
 Arguably, one of the leading acts of domestic violence against women in India is the 
dowry system. In a marriage that is arranged between two families, the woman’s family is tradi-
tionally expected to make certain promises to the man and his family to help the young couple 
establish themselves and begin their own nuclear family unit. Traditionally, this includes finan-
cial help to find the bride and groom a residence, providing them with a mode of transportation 
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and some essentials to begin their life and were given by the parents as symbols of affection and 
love (Rao, 1980, p. 99). What was initially a completely voluntary system has morphed into a 
grotesque social evil that claims the lives of many women every year.  
 In relation to the increasing presence and assimilation of western culture, urban living, 
and liberal ideas in Indian society, the attitudes towards have not changed proportionately (Rao, 
1980).  
 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 was enacted with the specific intention of reducing 
dowry related instances of domestic violence. Section 2 of the DPA defines dowry as “any prop-
erty or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly”, to (a) either 
party of the marriage by the other party or (b) given to either party by the parents of either party 
or any other person before or during the course of the marriage and in connection to the mar-
riage, but not including “dower” or “mahr” if the person is of the muslim religion (Dowry Prohi-
bition Act, 1961). The phrase “property or valuable security” used here is identical to the lan-
guage in the penal code, this further emphasizes the gravity of the current situation.  
 The term “dower” or “mahr” is distinct for ther term “dowry” and this illustrates the 
complexities of Indian Family Law Jurisprudence. Under English Common Law, dower is de-
fined as a “widow’s estate, typically a third of the deceased husband’s estate provided to her by 
law her support and the support of her children” (The Law Dictionary, n.d.). According Singh, 
2018 however, the term “dower” in the context of § 2b of the DPA has it’s roots in the Principles 
of Mohammedan Law, as written by Mulla in 1906 (Singh, 2018, p.59) . The term dower or mahr 
is defined as the consideration a wife receives upon marriage form the husband, as a sign of love 
and respect (Singh, 2018, p.59). Under muslim law, marriage is a civil contract between the hus-
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band and wife, as much “mahr” can be analogized as consideration pursuant to a valid contract 
(This is the polar opposite of the modern form of dower, where in most cases, the husband de-
mands the “property or valuable security” from the wife and her family). The woman is usually 
entitled to receive the mahr, for her support at the conclusion of the marriage, although arguably 
she should be entitled to the amount when she enters the marriage because if the contract is that 
the woman agrees to the man’s proposal for marriage in consideration of mahr, the amount 
should become payable once the marriage occurs. 
 Once again, the phrase “property or valuable security” is used. Bleur, et al., 2014, posited 
that at times dowry was considered compensation in exchange for the husband’s family provid-
ing the wife with accommodation and support. Compared to the conceptualization of “dower” 
under common law and muslim law, where the wife receives money from the husband upon his 
death (Common law) or upon marriage (muslim law), this definition of dowry sees the wife’s 
family basically pay the husband to take her in. Most domestic violence offenses in India thus 
happen in the context of the marriage and if the wife is killed by accident or by homicide, police 
officers are required to take special investigative steps to rule out suspicious circumstances.    
PART II- POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTH-
ER STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS  
 The State of New York has mandatory arrest provisions for domestic violence offenses. 
The New York Criminal Procedure Law § 140.10 (4) (b) (i) and (ii) requires a Police Officer to 
make a mandatory arrest, without a warrant, where the officer has “reasonable belief” that a do-
mestic violence offender if he is present at a residence in violation of a “duly served” order of 
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protection, issued against him, specifically requiring them to stay away from the residence of the 
victim. This section also requires that the offender be aware of the order of protection against 
him or have been present at the hearing, during which the order of protection was issued. Sub 
section (4) (b) (ii) also requires responding officers to arrest the offender if he commits a family 
offense as defined in § 812 (1) of the Family Court Act.  
 Mandatory arrests policies require police officers to arrest domestic violence abusers re-
gardless of the wishes of the victim. The N.Y.P.D is required to make mandatory arrests in cases 
where they reasonably suspect that a family member has committed a domestic violence crime 
against another family member. Family members are  current or former spouses, current or for-
mer intimate partners including in same sex couples and teens in dating relationships, persons 
with children in common and persons related by marriage. If the offender is present at the scene 
of the crime and the officer can effectuate arrest, they are obliged to do so. However, mandatory 
arrest does not mean immediate arrest. There are certain exceptions to the mandatory arrest poli-
cies. If both parties have committed violence against each other, the officer identifies the primary 
aggressor and only arrests that person. They must identify the nature and extent of injuries on 
each party. If one party committed acts of violence in self-defense, that is another exception to 
the mandatory arrest rule. Even if the aggressor is arrested, the victim has to create a safety plan 
to protect themselves.  
 The N.Y.P.D. also responds to violations of protection orders. Domestic violence preven-
tion officers visit victims homes citywide, provide counseling services and shelter alternatives, 
facilitate personal safety planning, and help victims obtain protection orders (Domestic Violence, 
n.d.). For immigrant domestic violence victims, and victims of trafficking the NYPD also pro-
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vides U Visa Certifications and T Visa Certifications, essential domestic to apply for U and T 
non-immigrant statuses (Domestic Violence, n.d.). The NYPD also conducts awareness and do-
mestic violence outreach programs (Domestic Violence, n.d.). 
 Section 4 (1) of the act states that any person with reasonable belief that a domestic vio-
lence act has been committed, is currently being committed or is likely to be committed shall in-
form a “Protection Officer” in good faith, and without incurring civil or criminal liabilities in the 
process, under subsection 2 (Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 42 of 2005, §  4 
(1)-(2). Protection Officers are appointees of the state government, appointed at the discretion of 
the executive branch of the government upon consideration of the requirements of the district, 
under § 8 of the act. Unlike the mandatory arrest requirement of the N.Y.P.D. under New York 
State law, one of the direct actions a protection officer can take in service of domestic violence 
victims in India is to make a domestic incident report for a magistrate who has been appointed as 
a “First Class Magistrate” or “Metropolitan Magistrate” in the place of residence of the Petitioner 
or the Respondent under §  27 of the Act.  
 The CrPC requires the appointment of first and second class district magistrates in every 
district of the union under § 11 of the code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §  11). Under 
PWDVA, the magistrates have the authority to issue protection orders, residence orders, mone-
tary reliefs, custody orders, and compensation orders. They are also required under §  5, along 
with protection officers and police officers to whom a domestic complaint is made to (a) inform 
the complainant of her right to seek a protection order, or any other order under the act, (b) in-
form her of the services, service providers and protection officers, (c) inform her of free legal 
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services available to her, and (d) inform her of the right to file a criminal complaint under § 498A 
of the IPC.  
 Compared to the proactive approach to handling domestic violence complaints of the 
N.Y.P.D, police and protection officers are only directly authorized to inform victims of their 
rights, duties and services available to them. Effectives of these provisions are at best, question-
able. An interdisciplinary study focused on police discretion in investigating deaths by burning, 
related to the demand for dowry in Mumbai and Delhi found that officers show a surprising 
amount of discretion in processing information and making decisions while conducting these in-
vestigations (Belur, et al., 2014, 439). They conducted interviews with burn victims, healthcare 
workers, and officers over 45 days and collected a sample size of 59 interviews (Belur, et al., 
2014, 442). They used data collected from the largest burn unit in Delhi as a control group 
(Belur, et al., 2014, 442).  
 Best practice policy and data surrounding investigation and response to domestic inci-
dents by law enforcement in Mumbai is scarce compared to the transparency witnessed in 
N.Y.P.D. policy. Belur, 2014, has done extensive research and provides a framework for a model 
police response in India, and compares it to the actual response of officers in Mumbai. Upon re-
ceiving information relating to the death of any person either accidentally or intentionally, a po-
lice officer under section 174 (1) of the CrPC is required to inform an executive magistrate with 
the power to conduct an investigation at the scene of the death, take not of the circumstances, 
injuries on the body, and a weapon if one is used (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 174 (1), 
(2)). If the deceased is female and has died within the first seven years of her marriage, or there 
are allegations of cruelty against the husband or the family of the husband, or a relative of the 
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wife (most often natal relative) makes a request to the police officer, or the officer has doubts 
about the circumstances of death, he must send the body of the victim to the nearest medical ex-
aminer, without undue delays that would render an examination useless under §  174 (3) of the 
CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 174 (3)). A magistrate is required to conduct an in-
quiry into the cause of death of any woman if she died within the first seven years of her mar-
riage and allegations of cruelty have been made against the husband or his family under sub sec-
tion 1 of § 176 of the CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 176 (1)). The magistrate is 
also empowered to call for a medical examination and collect evidence under this section.  
 Compared to the legal framework enshrined in the criminal procedure code, Belur, 2014, 
found that law enforcement officers in Mumbai operate with a higher level of discretion in terms 
of conducting an inquest than officers in Delhi and the interpretation of inquest powers of the 
Magistrate under §176 of the CrPC (Belur, 2014). 
PART III- CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSES, PUN-
ISHMENTS PRESCRIBED FOR OFFENDERS, AND VICTIM REMEDIES IN CUR-
RENT LEGISLATIONS 
Culture 
 There are several cultural variables that likely impact the definitions and responses to-
ward domestic violence offenses and the investigations into these crimes in the United States and 
India. In the United States, marriage is strictly a ‘private matter’ in some senses compared to In-
dia. In this case, a ‘private matter’ means that parties operate with maximum autonomy to enter 
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into and exit domestic relationships. Families of parties hardly ever have any input in their pri-
vate lives.  
 Comparatively in India, adults live at home with their parents. Many instances of these 
“joint families” see multiple siblings living under the same roof as their parents. Women have 
historically been delegated to household chores, child rearing and childcare. Female employment 
post marriage is highly discouraged in a joint family situation. The likelihood of exploitation is 
also high.  Today, even though many adults in urban areas are moving away from the model 
wherein families arrange marriage and the married couple continues to live at home even after 
marriage. There is a long history of oppressive patriarchy in Indian culture. Once a wife is 
brought into the husband’s family home, there is a high likelihood of exploitation. A study in 
2018 found that there is a high correlation of domestic violence among a sample of recently mar-
ried women, living in under-privileged neighborhoods in Pune, a city in the State of Maharashtra 
in India (Kalokhe, 2018). Kalokhe, 2018, found that domestic violence experiences correlated 
positively more often with age, level of education, level of social attainment or social standing, 
and attitudes where it was accepted for husbands to beat their wives (Kalokhe, 2018).  
 This study is relevant here because the sample was collected in a city close to Mumbai, 
that is governed by the same legislations. Pune is three hours from Mumbai and shares values 
and cultures. The study findings are also relevant here because it shows that domestic violence is 
more often experienced among married women in the initial years of marriage, this is reflected in 
the Penal codes that penalizes cruelty against the wife by the husband under § 498A of the IPC. 
The emphasis on domestic violence offenses by dating partners prior to marriage is relatively 
low compared to the United States and the State of New York. This class of victims has thus far 
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remained undiscovered. Therefore, unlike in the State of New York where all forms of domestic 
violence offenses such as assault, stalking, strangulation, criminal mischief, harassment, and 
Non-consensual dissemination of intimate media regardless of marital status and gender are iden-
tified and prohibited, domestic offenses in India are most often against married women and in 
relation to the demand, giving and receiving dowry. 
 Another distinction, stemming from the joint family culture is arguably that in India, men 
do not become independent as they never leave their parent’s home. They do not learn how to be 
responsible adults. In the archival data used by Krishnan, 2015, who analyzed Supreme Court 
Rulings in India, 65% of the victims lived with their extended family in a joint family scenario 
(Krishnan, 2015). In their meta analysis on 164 Supreme Court cases in India, the husband’s par-
ents were implicated 61% of the time.   
Offenses and Punishments  
 New York Penal Laws (PEN) define many criminal acts that are considered domestic vio-
lence offenses. PEN § 120.00 defines Assault in the third degree as when a person intentionally, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence causes physical injury to another person. This is consid-
ered a “class A misdemeanor” carrying with itself a sentence of no more than 364 days ( New 
York Penal Laws Art. 70 § 70.15 (1)). Menacing in the second degree under§ 120.15 of PEN is 
defined as (1) places another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury 
or death by showing them a firearm, (2) follows the person or commits intentional acts that put 
the fear of an injury, serious injury or death (New York Penal Laws § 120.14). This is differenti-
ated from the crime of stalking because under PEN § 120.45, stalking in the fourth degree is de-
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fined as conduct that “is likely to cause reasonable fear of mental harm to the physical health, 
safety or property of such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party 
with whom such person is acquainted” or causes actual “material harm to the mental health” by 
telephoning or initiating contact with the victim or a family member of the victim after being 
“clearly informed” to cease that conduct (New York Penal Laws § 120.45). Stalking is a class A 
misdemeanor with a sentence of less than a year while menacing is a class B misdemeanor that 
shall not exceed a term of three months (New York Penal Laws Art. 70 § 70.15 (2)). Multiple, 
repeated offenses raise the sentence of the each offense in New York and first degree offenses 
carry felony level punishments.  
 New York State also has laws against strangulation and revenge porn. PEN § 121.11, a 
person is guilty of “strangulation” or criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation if he 
applies pressure to the throat or neck, or blocks the nose or mouth of the victim (New York Penal 
Laws, §  121.11). This is a class A misdemeanor. Another class A misdemeanor under PEN § 
245.15 is the publication of a still or video image of a person identifiable in the published media 
or by information connected to the media with the intent to cause physical, financial or emotional 
harm to the welfare of that person (New York Penal Laws §245.15 (1) (a)). This section further 
states that the media published must depict an unclothed or exposed intimate part of the person, 
or depict the person engage in sexual conduct and had a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
the publisher had knowledge of this expectation of privacy (New York Penal Laws §245.15 (1) 
(a)- (b)). This is the revenge porn statute in New York. Certain exceptions to this statute such as 
dissemination or publication for reporting of an unlawful conduct, in pursuit of common prac-
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tices of law enforcement, any voluntary exposure in a public place or commercial setting or legit-
imate public purpose (New York Penal Laws §245.15 (4)). 
 As discussed in previous parts, one of the most pervasive domestic violence offenses still 
prevalent in India is related to Dowry. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 penalizes the giving and 
receiving of dowry under § 3 with a minimum prison term of 5 years and a fine of fifteen thou-
sand rupees or the amount of the dowry, whichever is greater (The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, 
§ 3). The act also distinguishes the completed crime from the attempt to commit the crime or 
“demand”. § 4 prescribes a sentence of six months to two years and a fine of ten thousand ru-
pees(The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, § 4). While this act attempts to criminalize the act of 
Dowry, it is challenged by centuries of tradition and religious beliefs. Therefore, under § 304 B 
of the IPC there are special provisions for women who have died within the first seven years of 
the marriage and the death is caused by bodily injury or burns and the husband or relatives of the 
husband are implicated, any person convicted could face a minimum prison term of seven years 
to life (Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 304 B).  
 Another crime that can be classified as a domestic offense in India is that of honor 
killings. Malviya, 2019, in the Times of India outlines this issue that is yet to be criminalized un-
der Indian criminal statutes. The term honor killing is confusing because there is nothing honor-
able about murder, the term has come to mean the murder of an unmarried woman by her own 
parents/ relatives should she make a decision to marry a person from another caste, thereby “dis-
honoring the family” (Malviya, 2019). Present statutes prescribing punishments for murder act as 
a deterrent against this crime. Recently however, the courts have started examining this issue.  
 A similar non-criminalized domestic violence offense is marital rape. § 375 of the IPC 
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prohibits rape as the nonconsensual intercourse against the will of the woman, and if the woman 
consents, the consent was obtained through threats or coercion (Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 375). 
The punishment for rape is prescribed in § 376 as a minimum sentence of 7 years to life (Indian 
Penal Code, 1860, § 376). Yet, an exception to section 375 explicitly allows a man to have sexual 
intercourse with his adult wife regardless of whether she consents (Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 
375).  The CLA, 2013, amended the definition of § 375 to include other intimate parts of a 
woman’s body and acts that would constitute penetration, the issue of marital rape is not ad-
dressed and continues to remain legal (The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013, § 9). 
Legal Remedies and Victim Services 
 Obtaining a divorce could provide a permanent solution to protect victims of domestic 
violence in a marriage. New York State DRL § 170 provides for the grounds of divorce (DRL § 
170). Although divorce law is bifurcated by religion in India, most statues consider “cruelty” as a 
ground for divorce. In New York, §  170 (1) “Cruel and Inhuman Treatment” allows a plaintiff 
who has suffered cruel or inhuman treatment at the hand of the defendant so as to endanger the 
physical and mental health and wellbeing of the plaintiff and making it difficult to live with the 
defendant (Domestic Relation Law, § 170 (1)). The Hindu Marriage Act, 1954, mirrors the cruel-
ty language under §  13 (1), giving the victim the ability to obtain a divorce (The Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1954 § 13 (1)). Similar language is also used in statutes governing marriages between peo-
ple of the Muslim Religion under §  2 (viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. 
The Special Marriage Act 1954 mirrors this language as well under § 27 (1) (d). This “Special 
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Marriage Act” governs the union between people of different religions. It is therefore almost uni-
versally accepted that in a marriage if one party is abusive or cruel to another and mistreats them, 
the victim can file for a divorce.  
 In modern practice however, filing for divorce under § 170 (1) in New York can be a long 
and arduous process. Depending upon the complexity of the case, whether the parties have chil-
dren in common, property in common, or even pets in common, a divorce generally means the 
equitable distribution of all assets and liabilities. Both parties are best served by retaining coun-
sel and both parties are required to co-operate, negotiate, appear and discuss the division. This is 
a time consuming process which could go on for longer if one of them is unwilling to come to an 
agreement. Furthermore, victims of domestic violence could be at risk every time they are asked 
to meet with the defendant and their attorneys. Even if the defendant does not outright attack the 
victim physically, there is emotional trauma in having to sit and discuss mundanities of equitable 
distribution, that only the victims understand. A mutual consent divorce under § 170 (7) of DRL, 
“Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage” and similar provisions under Indian law could provide a 
streamlined approach to the divorce with a minimum requirement for contact between the par-
ties. Attorneys could negotiate on their behalf to facilitate an agreeable “Stipulation of Settle-
ment” which can then be used to obtain an uncontested divorce in New York.  
 Protection orders, as aforementioned are another remedy available to victims. Protection 
orders with subsequent divorce filing could effectively protect women against abusive partners. 
A protection order in a New York State Family Court is obtained by filing a family offense peti-
tion against a respondent. This is the Family Court, General Form 5 (see Appendix - 1). This 
form outlines that the respondent must stay away from the home, school, business, place of em-
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ployment of the petitioner. Further, it prohibits respondents from contacting the petitioner Suo 
Sponte, however the petitioner is free to contact the respondent. This is inadvisable because re-
spondent could use the fact that petitioner contacted them to have the temporary protection order 
suspended. It further prohibits criminal acts against the petitioner and prohibits respondent from 
entering the residence of petitioner. In some cases it requires them to return identification docu-
ments, surrender all firearms and refrain from obtaining firearms pursuant to the order. A Family 
Offense Petitioner is generally heard with minimal delay, based upon the imminency of the 
threat. Once the Petitioner makes the family offense, a temporary protection order is granted un-
der Part 4, Article 8, § 828 of the FCA.  
 Failure to comply with a protection order makes respondent criminally liable and also 
liable to the family court for contempt of court. Failure to comply results in mandatory arrest of a 
respondent and it makes them liable to a seven year prison prison term if criminally prosecuted 
or a six month term for contempt of the family court. Non-availability of an equivalent document 
of the Bombay High Court could mean that Magistrates issue protection orders after a case by 
case analysis. A Boolean search on google.com for “India” and “Kalyan District Court Protec-
tion” revealed no results. 
 Under the PWDVA, § 18 to § 25 empowers Judicial Magistrates to make protection or-
ders. These orders are bifurcated as “Protection Order” (18), “Residence Order” (19), “Monetary 
Reliefs” (20), “Custody Order” (21), and “Compensation order” (22). The first distinction prima 
facie is that separate orders are issued for separate reliefs. While the New York Family Court has 
a Separate Order Directing (Custody) (Visitation) (see Appendix 2), there is no provision for a 
separate monetary or compensation order at the initial stages when the Family Offense Petition is 
Page  of 51 76
CRJ-791: DomViol-Draft1
filed and any custody or visitation granted at this stage is temporary, for the duration of the order. 
The primary focus of GF-5 is the immediate protection of petitioner from respondent (Domestic 
Violence Family Offense, n.d.). A final protection order could include restitution, medical ex-
penses, or a requirement that respondent participate in a program (Domestic Violence Family 
Offense, n.d.). 
 A second distinction, in protection orders under § 18 of PWDVA is clause (e), Alienation 
of joint or separate assets GF-5 does not provide for the same. GF-5, further does not explicitly 
prevent respondent from divesting the marital household or his interest in the same as provided 
in § 19 of PWDVA. This, again is not a concern at the initial stages of litigation in New York 
State Family Courts. Similar to the procedure in New York, orders under PWDVA can be granted 
ex-parte and interim as and when required at the discretion of the court under § 23 (2). Finally, 
while temporary orders in New York extend to the adjournment date, Under clause (1) of § 25 of 
PWDVA, protection orders (18) could extend indefinitely until the “aggrieved party applies for a 
discharge”. This gives considerable power to victims over such orders in India.  
 There are also several non-legislative remedies available to victims. District Attorneys in 
the five boroughs of New York City have implemented policies and programs to better serve vic-
tims. District Attorney New York (DANY) has stated that they intend to help victims be safe, 
“independent of the criminal justice system”, and increase trust among victims for the criminal 
justice system to encourage victims to approach courts, to provide legal safeguards afforded to 
victims in orders of protection, to develop strong “relationships with partner agencies to solve 
underlying issues preventing victims from leaving their abusers” (Vance, 2016). Further the 
DANY uses the Witness Aid Services Unit (WASU) to make sure there is continuous contact be-
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tween witnesses or victims and the prosecution. WASU not only ensures witness co-operation 
but also provides crisis management support (Vance, 2016).   
 In Kings County, the DA’s office works closely with the Brooklyn Family Justice Center, 
a “one-stop” center that provides for multiple services to victims of domestic violence, sexual 
assault, sex trafficking, elder abuse (Gonzalez, 2018). One strategy the Brooklyn DA employs is 
that the family justice center offices are located near the DA’s office to facilitate easy access to 
victim services. The DA’s office also employs a Special Victims Bureau that investigates and 
prosecutes sexual assault cases, and abuse and neglect of children. The DAs office relies on sur-
vivors input and participation as key elements of successful prosecutions. Kings County also has 
the Early Victim Engagement (EVE) Project, Peterson (2013) found that a greater percentage of 
victims (65%) contacted by EVE staff came to the Brooklyn DAs office and completed the in-
take interview (Peterson, 2013). This program was created to contact a victim as soon as a de-
fendant was arraigned in Brooklyn Criminal Court (Peterson, 2013, p. 1). Since victims are not 
present at arraignments, EVE staff inform them about their cases and explain to them the provi-
sions of protection orders an how to enforce them (Peterson, 2013, p. 1). This study examined 
whether there was an increase in victim participation as a result of the EVE project, the success 
rate of the project in scheduling appointments and whether this project had any effect on convic-
tion rates (Peterson, 2013, p. 11). This study found that there was a modest increase in participa-
tion from early victim engagement and percentages of conviction went from 23.6% before EVE 
implementation to 32.6% after implementation (Peterson, 2013, p. 51).  
 Along with the prerequisite Court Assistance Programs, Domestic Violence Bureaus, 
Family Justice Centers, Richmond County District Attorney (RCDA) also partnered with the 
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“Luv on a Leash” therapy program that makes registered therapy dogs to crime victims and wit-
nesses to comfort and help them cope with the “challenges of the criminal justice process” (Mc-
Mohan, 2018, p. 17). The RCDA has also expanded its accessibility to victims by creating a sep-
arate “domestic violence complaint room”, expanding nighttime hours and having trained staff 
and ADAs available to draft complaints, collect evidence against the offender and provide im-
mediate assistance to victims with the help of the N.Y.P.D. (McMohan, 2018, p. 15). 
 In a 2019 article on the future of domestic violence prosecutions in Queens County, then 
acting DA, John Ryan mentions the Domestic Violence Strategic Threat Alert Tea, (DVSTAT), 
implemented in 2018 because nearly half domestic violence abusers fled the scene of the crime 
before police arrived (Ryan, 2019). DVSTAT is staffed with ADAs who co-ordinate with other 
stakeholders to “identify and enhance prosecution” of high risk domestic violence cases before 
the offender is apprehended. NYPD and victim organizations participating in DVSTAT send 
complaint reports to the ADAs who compile them in a database using proprietary computer soft-
ware and log key information such as offender prior criminal history, access to fire arms, and 
propensity for violating protection orders (Ryan, 2019). Based on this, the complaints are given a 
numeric score and similar to the EVE program, assigned ADAs begin contacting victims to bring 
them into the office. This allows ADAs to inform victims of their rights, help them create a safe-
ty plan and preserve evidences like bruise marks immediately after the incident (Ryan, 2019). 
ADAs can inform victims and witnesses to seek out medical attention and services. This creates 
records, to aid in prosecutions.  
 DVSTAT has led to a 76% conviction rate in Queens County. Further, in the first half of 
2019 Queens County District Attorney (QCDA) Office drafted 10 search warrants and recovered 
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guns, drugs, drug paraphernalia, and forged credit cards (Ryan, 2019). They also drafted 100 
complaints and first party complaints and conducted extensive victim outreach (700 victims). 
Queens county was also the first county to implement an experimental probation supervision 
program under the direction of the Mayor of the City of New York in 2018 (Ryan, 2019). The 
Interim Probation Domestic Violence Team (QIPDVT) aims to reduced recidivism by targeting 
the specific criminogenic needs of the domestic violence offenders and creating individualized 
programs (Ryan, 2019). One of the biggest service providers for victims of intimate partner vio-
lence in the city of New York is “Safe Horizon”. They provide shelter, legal advice and safety 
planning services to victims.  
 A counterpart to “Safe Horizon” in New York is the NGO, Sneha in Mumbai. This is the 
organization that runs crisis centers to provide immediate and long term counseling and facilitate 
access to medical, legal and police services (Sneha Mumbai, n.d.). They provide sensitivity train-
ing to law enforcement, hospital staff and legal aid lawyers and lobby for implementation of pub-
lic policy and legal statutes (Sneha Mumbai, n.d.).    
PART IV- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSE PRECEDENTS 
 The appellate court of the second department in New York have previously granted cus-
tody of minor children with the mother when the mother credibly alleged domestic violence and 
the court was unconvinced by the husband’s denial (Felty v. Felty, 2013). Further, the trial courts 
are required to take the effects of domestic violence one the best interests of the child when mak-
ing a custody determination under DRL § 240 (1) and the appellate division dismissed the cus-
tody determination of a trial court not considering the effects of domestic violence was dismissed 
(Matter of Rodriguez v. Guerra, 2006). In the State of New York, most cases that address domes-
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tic violence in the context of child custody. Exposing young kids to domestic violence is not 
grounds for negligence pre se but if the child is actually, physically harmed or is in danger of 
imminently being harmed, the parents would be found negligent, even if there has been only one 
instance (Matter of Aliyah T. (Jaivon T.), 2019).  
 These cases address domestic violence in a civil context and the courts agree that domes-
tic violence offenders must not have custody of minor children.  
 In Kamlesh Devi v. Jaipal & Ors., the Supreme Court of India upheld the decision of the 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana and disposed of a petition that did not effectively argue the 
elements of domestic violence, namely cohabitation and abuse by family members (Kamlesh 
Devi v. Jaipal  & Ors., 2019). In State of West Bengal v. Dipak Haldar & Anr, 2009, a case in the 
Supreme Court of India where the victim was burned to death on 10/25/1987, the facts show that 
she was constantly tortured physically can mentally since she was married. The wife’s death by 
burning occurred less than two years after the marriage, the burning was so intense that it sepa-
rated the bones from the flesh, the respondent did not show that he did not take any steps to pro-
tect his wife or prevent her  death. Further there was evidence in that case that the wife was as-
saulted before her death, and the respondent was calling his wife names at the time of her death 
and tried to hide evidence. High Court’s ruling of guilt was upheld here.  
 There appear to be stark differences in the approach that New York Courts take to domes-
tic violence compared to courts in India. Today, in the United States, domestic violence can be 
stemmed at it’s inception in most cases. Victims have access to many resources and a support 
network that could identify, and save women from domestic violence abusers. Culturally, the first 
and second wave feminist movements have also empowered women and given them an individ-
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ual voice. This sadly is not the case in India. Women are still expected to be subservient to men, 
boys and girls are treated differently and conditioned from birth in specific gender models. As a 
result, legal precedents in India still bear witness to horrific fact patterns while a cursory search 
for “Domestic Violence” on the LexisNexis database reveals courts addressing domestic violence 
where both parties are still living, and in the context of the best interest of the child. 
PART V- CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In the United States, domestic violence has been recognized as a violent offense far 
longer than in India, where PWDVA has only come into existence since 2005. This, among other 
spurious variables that explains the rediscovery of some victim categories and not others in In-
dia. This study aimed to provide an overview of the legislative landscape on domestic violence in 
the United States and India and attempt to answer the question, “How cultural differences impact 
the implementation of legislation to tackle the crime of domestic violence?”. This study selected 
a number of code sections from a selection of statutes currently implemented in both countries 
and posits that Indian culture has a significant impact on the emphasis a statute places on particu-
lar domestic violence offenses and the available remedies to victims.  
 The main motivating factor behind domestic violence offense in India is dowry. Multiple 
code sections across the legislative landscape has addressed the issue in their codes. The Dowry 
Prohibition Act of 1961, along with § 498A of the Indian Penal Code has attempted to outlaw 
this practice, yet the act of demanding, giving or receiving dowry does not sufficiently deter 
would be aggressors. This focus on eradicating the practice of dowry can be viewed as an at-
tempt by the government to preserve the sanctity of the institute of marriage while protecting 
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women who move into the husband’s house with his parents after marriage. This is the cultural 
bedrock of India.  
 The culture of the United States relating to family law, domestic violence offenses and 
protection of women and children is completely different. The emphasis on and the extent of 
individuality, autonomy and freedom of thought and expression means that for a majority of the 
population, the decision to enter into adult domestic relationships, reside with a significant other, 
whether before or after marriage is a very personal, private and intimate decision. Extended fam-
ily input, if sought, is more often to inform rather than obtain permission. This requires strong 
statutes that protect women against aggressive, abusive, and dangerous partners who would hurt 
or kill them. New York State statutes against stalking, harassment, criminal mischief, against il-
legal dissemination of intimate media without consent is meant to protect one individual party 
from another. Compared to India, the granting of a temporary protection order is instantaneous 
and ex-parte when the Plaintiff demonstrates an immediate threat to their health and safety. Both 
countries have governed domestic violence as a crime under criminal codes, yet cultural differ-
ences bleed into the law.  
 A policy recommendation could be that India should adopt  a new bipartisan, non-reli-
gious code governing family law and domestic violence. Further, the PWDVA could be amended 
to incorporate and list specific offenses that are considered domestic violence offenses. Police 
and protection officers must facilitate protection orders and magistrates must grant protection 
orders without undue delay. India could follow an approach similar to the United States and have 
the complainant appear before the court the same the the Family Offense Petition is file, however 
the issue of low reporting of domestic violence cases and the instinct to lie and protect the hus-
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band in India might prevent the successful implementation of this policy. Honor killing and mari-
tal rape must be treated more seriously under the current legislation and the code must be 
amended to include code sections punishing these offenses. New York Family Courts could in-
corporate clauses preventing the respondent from divesting their assets/ residence in temporary 
protection orders, as and when applicable. A corresponding new list item could be added to 
GF-5.   
 There are certain limitations to this study, reliance on publicly available resources and 
secondary data is one limitation. This study attempted to analyze the differences in United States 
and Indian law by focusing on the codified statutes implemented in both countries, a stronger 
framework for analysis could be used in future studies. This study has devolved into a side-by-
side analysis of the laws which provide an overview and in-depth understanding of current laws. 
Yet, future studies could take a much broader scope for analysis, focusing specifically on reli-
gious laws, their reflection on civil law and the lived experiences of religious minorities in India, 
compared to the United States.  
 One possible question for future research could be “Are minorities better served by a uni-
form civil code of family law compared to separated codified laws derived from religious texts?” 
The uniform civil code of family law would apply to every person in the jurisdiction of the law 
regardless of religion. Another direction for further research could be interdisciplinary and exam-
ine the psychological effects of dependance on parents in joint families, never leaving home and 
whether these effects have any correlations to domestic violence. It would also be interesting to 
examine the family law prevalent in the United States and compare them to India where a uni-
form civil code for family law has not been implemented thus far. 
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